Butler University

Digital Commons @ Butler University
Scholarship and Professional Work - LAS

College of Liberal Arts & Sciences

9-24-2010

Just Military Preparedness: A New Category of Just War Theory
Harry van der Linden
Butler University, hvanderl@butler.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.butler.edu/facsch_papers
Part of the Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons

Recommended Citation
van der Linden, Harry, "Just Military Preparedness: A New Category of Just War Theory" Paper Presented
at the Department of Philosophy at Michigan State University / (2010): 1-24.
Available at https://digitalcommons.butler.edu/facsch_papers/1073

This Conference Proceeding is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Liberal Arts & Sciences at
Digital Commons @ Butler University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarship and Professional Work LAS by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Butler University. For more information, please contact
digitalscholarship@butler.edu.

1
Harry van der Linden
Butler University
hvanderl@butler.edu

This paper was presented at the Department of Philosophy at Michigan State University,
September 24, 2010. A few notes have been added or updated.

Abstract
This presentation discusses why just war theory is in need of just military preparedness (jus ante
bellum) as a new category of just war thinking and it articulates six principles of just military
preparedness. The paper concludes that the United States fails to satisfy any of these principles
and addresses how this bears on the application of jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum
norms to possible future American military interventions.

Just Military Preparedness: A New Category of Just War Theory
1. The “Triumph” of Just War Theory

In a 2002 article with the title “The Triumph of Just War Theory (and the Dangers of Success),”
Michael Walzer wrote: “The triumph of just war theory is clear enough; it is amazing how
readily military spokesmen during the Kosovo and Afghanistan wars used its categories, telling a
causal story that justified the war and providing accounts of the battles that emphasized the
restraint with which they were being fought.” 1 Walzer warns that one of the dangers of the
success of just war theory is “a certain softening of the critical mind, a truce between theorists
and soldiers,” and he reminds us that “decisions about when and how to fight require constant
scrutiny, exactly as they always have.” 2 It is doubtful that today, after the U.S. war of aggression
1
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against Iraq, Walzer would still speak in the same cheering way about the “triumph” of just war
theory, and, surely, this war confirms his point that constant scrutiny is imperative.
Still, it is the case that just war theory has been in some ways remarkably successful. It is
taught at the main military academies, there has been since 2001 a successful Journal of Military
Ethics, and academics and military meet yearly at the international conference of the
International Society of Military Ethics.3 Military ethics, significantly based on just war theory,
is also increasingly taught at military academies in Europe, Australia, and Canada. And Walzer
has a point that both political and military leaders in the U.S. at times talk the talk of just war
theory. An interesting illustration of this is Barack Obama’s Nobel Peace Prize acceptance
speech on December 10, 2009. In this speech, Obama rejects the nonviolence of M.L. King, Jr.
and Gandhi and situates his own view within the just war tradition. He writes that over time
“philosophers, clerics and statesmen [sought] to regulate the destructive power of war” [and that]
the concept of a ‘just war’ emerged, suggesting that war is justified only when it meets certain
preconditions: if it is waged as a last resort or in self-defense; if the force used is proportional,
and if, whenever possible, civilians are spared from violence.” Obama continues to argue that
the concept of just war was rarely observed in practice until after the Second World War with, of
course, the United States as trailblazer. Last, Obama stresses that it is important to avoid the
“tragic choice” of war and find ways of building “true peace,” which involves “not just freedom
from fear, but freedom of want.”
In my view, Obama gets one basic premise of just war theory correct and that is, in his
own words, “that no matter how justified, war promises human tragedy.” He adds “”The
soldier’s courage and sacrifice is full of glory, expressing devotion to country, to cause and to
comrades in arms. But war itself is never glorious, and we must never trumpet it as such.” In
other words, resort to violence is tragic, rather than enabling human flourishing as the militarists
or some revolutionaries would have it, but violence also is not always wrong, as the pacifist
3
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would have it. And since resort to violence or military force is tragic, just war theory places
strong limiting constraints on resort to force and on how force is executed. But does the wide
acceptance of just war theory actually lead to such constraints being placed on force? It seems
that just war theory as instantiated in the laws of war (the Geneva Conventions, etc.) places some
constraints on the manner in which the United States fights its wars. Jus in bello constraints also
seem to fit with common morality, and this places further constraints on the ways that the United
States executes its force. Walzer writes: “The media are omnipresent, and the whole world is
watching. War has to be different in these circumstances.”4 Pentagon perception management
weakens this point, but does not invalidate it. Moreover, the prevailing wars of today, the
asymmetric wars, require U.S. forces to win the support of the local population, and this
necessitates that jus in bello restrictions are upheld to some degree. But what about the jus ad
bellum principles: Do they actually place constraints on American resort to force?

2. On the Failure of Just War Theory

In Failed States (2006) and especially in Hegemony or Survival (2002), Noam Chomsky in effect
argues that just war theory fails to place serious limiting constraints on American resort to force.
In his view, just war theory is basically a tool of legitimizing the American pursuit of political
and economic dominance through military means, and this is exemplified by the fact that just
war theorists typically end up supporting indefensible American interventions. 5 In response, it
must be said that Chomsky overstates his case and is selective in his analysis. For example, he
4
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criticizes Walzer for his support of the Kosovo and Afghanistan wars, but fails to note that
Walzer opposed to the second Iraq war. 6 Still, I agree that just war theorists are not critical
enough with regard to America’s military role in the world and its history of questionable
interventions since the end of the Second World War. Moreover, it seems that just war theory
indeed lends itself too easily to moral window dressing by the prevailing military and political
powers. So what is the solution? Should we reject just war theory?
I think that a complete rejection of just war theory is an error for three reasons. First of
all, we need some moral framework in order to arrive at reasoned judgments about the resort to
military force as well as its execution. Of course, we should not exclude the possibility that there
might be a better normative framework than just war theory regarding the use of violence for
political purposes, but critics of just war theory seldom articulate any alternatives even remotely
up to the task at hand. 7 Second, just war theory seems to be the outcome of questions that are
important to address whenever the concern is the morality of using bad or harmful means toward
a good collective end. For example, what is the nature and weight of the collective good so that it
may warrant the bad means? The jus ad bellum principle of just cause seeks to address this
question. Or, we may ask, who has the authority and competence to make the decision to use
harmful means, and in this way we arrive at the principle of legitimate authority of just war
6
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theory. Or, we may wonder whether the collective good is proportionate to the anticipated bad
consequences, and so we arrive at the proportionality principle. In short, the principles of just
war theory seem embedded in more general principles of a plausible political morality
concerning ends and means. Third, just war theory is widely used in the West to talk about
moral matters related to armed force, and its rejection means severing oneself from this discourse
and the possibility of influencing it. A recent report commissioned by former United Nations
Secretary-General Kofi Annan suggests even an increasing global acceptance of just war theory.
The Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, charged with the task of
addressing how the United Nations should deal with humanitarian intervention and new security
threats, such as global terrorism, concludes that the U.N. Security Council should take into
account “five criteria of legitimacy” when deliberating about the resort to force. The criteria
overlap with just war principles, including such criteria as seriousness of treat (”just cause” in
just war theory), proper purpose (“right intention” in just war theory), and last resort (shared with
just war theory). Most members of the High-level Panel were from non-Western countries,
indicating that just war theory principles might have a global reach. 8
In my view, then, the task is to modify just war theory so that it becomes in practice more
critical of resort to force in general and U.S. military interventions in particular. Just war theory
has until recently hardly been subjected to detailed philosophical analysis. Here the work, for
example, of David Rodin and Jeff McMahan may be noted, which has begun to subject such just
war theory principles as the just cause principle to careful analysis. The overall result seems to
8
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be that just war theory is moving into a more pacifistic direction. But there seem to be limits to
this enterprise. One shortcoming of just war theory is that it looks at each intervention anew and
seeks to assess it on its own merits rather than place it within the historical context of the country
considering resort to military force. With regard to the United States, the error is that its
interventions are not judged in the context of the American project of seeking and maintaining
global military superiority since the end of the Second World War. The second, and related
shortcoming, is, in the words of antiwar feminists Carol Cohn and Sara Ruddick, that “just war
theorists tend to abstract particular wars from the war system on which they rely and which they
strengthen.” This “war system” involves “arming, training, and organizing for possible wars;
allocating the resources these preparations require; creating a culture in which wars are seen as
morally legitimate, even alluring; and shaping and fostering the masculinities and femininities
that undergird men’s and women’s acquiescence to war.”9

3. Just Military Preparedness Principles

In order to address these shortcomings, I hold that just war theory is in need of a new category of
just war thinking (in addition to jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum) with its own
principles. I call this category “just military preparedness,” or, in line with the commonly used
naming of the other just war theory categories, it may be called jus potentia ad bellum, or, more
briefly (but less accurately), jus ante bellum. Military preparedness raises two types of justice
concerns. First, we may raise questions about whether the military preparation of a country is
9
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just toward its military personnel, places a fair burden on the civilian population, reflects
adequate civilian control, and the like. Second, we may raise questions about whether the
military preparation of a country is such that it is conducive to the country resorting to force only
when justice is on its side, as well as to executing and concluding war in a just manner. My
ultimate concern is military preparedness that is just in the second sense – that is, how should we
prepare for the possibility of military conflicts so that wars will be only justly initiated, executed,
and concluded? However, since military preparedness that lacks justice in the first sense will be
an obstacle to realizing justice in the second sense, my just military preparedness (JMP)
principles also aim at addressing justice in the first sense.
I will proceed as follows: I will first state six JMP principles and briefly show that the
United States as military hegemon fails to satisfy all of them. The principles are significantly the
outcome of raising the questions of the political morality of means and ends with regard to
military preparedness, including questions of just cause or purpose, legitimate authority, and
proportionality. Next, I will discuss how unjust American military preparedness bears on the
application of jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum principles to possible future U.S.
interventions.10 My overall conclusion is that armed interventions by the U.S. as military
hegemon are very likely to be unjust. Of course, my conclusion is based on controversial
political premises. Moreover, each of the six JMP principles deserves more discussion and moral
analysis. Even so, I hope to show that JMP is a valuable addition to just war theory.
10
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The first principle says that the basic defense structure of a country should accord with
its general purpose of using military force only for the sake of protecting people against
extensive basic human rights infringements caused by large-scale armed violence. This principle
accepts the common view that aggression – defined as a violation of political sovereignty and
territorial integrity – is a just cause for resort to military force, but adds the qualification that the
aggression must also involve the threat of widespread basic human rights violations. So, a mere
violation of territorial integrity, for example, is not an adequate cause for resort to force. 11 Each
country should in the first instance focus its defense structure on protecting its own people
against aggression. Preparation for humanitarian intervention and assisting other states subjected
to aggression (i.e., “maintaining international security”) are additional responsibilities, but these
tasks should be approached as shared or collective responsibilities.

Since humanitarian

intervention threatens international stability, the threshold for human rights violations for just
intervention in this form must be higher than in the case of national self-defense.
National self-defense, humanitarian intervention, and maintaining international security
do not require an American military of global power projection, a military with high-tech
weapons that have a global reach, bases in dozens of countries, and aircraft carriers roaming
across the oceans.12 For these goals, we also don’t need a large professional army of around 1.6
million (FTE) and a military budget of at least 700 billion, close to 50% of global military
expenditures.13 Obviously, only a small military force would be needed to protect the United
11
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States itself from acts of aggression. The notion of a foreign nation attacking the United States is
farfetched, while terrorism, in general, is not a real military problem but, rather, a criminal
problem requiring, foremost, a police response, international crime cooperation, obstructing the
financial sources of terrorism, securing of WMD materials, and the like. 14 In the long run, the
elimination of terrorist threats also requires the elimination of social conditions favorable to
terrorism (see, further, the third principle of just military preparedness). Similarly, humanitarian
intervention as a global responsibility to protect civilians from massive attacks on their security
rights requires only small military forces trained for this purpose, and the high-tech focus of the
American military is a liability here rather than an asset.
The only justification for a more extensive American military force is the task of
maintaining international security. This is the function that is typically stressed by defenders of
the status quo and it is disingenuously linked to the security and freedom of the American people
themselves. The international security argument for America’s global military presence has some
clear gaps. It is difficult to see how it justifies America’s continuous and even more extensive
military presence in Europe after the end of the Cold War. Or, how does it justify the creation of
America’s latest regional command -- U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) -- as part of an
attempt to extend its “bootprint” in Africa. Surely, if America’s concern was simply to contribute
to international security, it would seek to strengthen the United Nations as well as regional
alliances and it would seek to diminish its military presence wherever possible. The very reverse
is happening. In Vision 2020, the US Space Command, now unified with the United States
Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), articulated as its aim “dominating the space dimension
14
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of military operations to protect US interests and investment.” 15 Indeed, this seems to get us
closer to the truth, but it gets father away from anything that could be called “just military
preparedness.”
There are strong voices within the present American military establishment claiming that
America’s current basic defense orientation is in need of change. In a 2009 article with the title
“A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age,” Defense Secretary Robert
M. Gates argues that the Pentagon should move away from the illusion that “it is possible to
cow, shock, or awe an enemy into submission, instead of tracking enemies down hilltop by
hilltop, house by house, block by bloody block.” The illusion goes hand in hand with the
problem that America’s weapon systems (in the words of Gates) “have grown ever more
baroque, have become ever more costly, are taking longer to build, and are being fielded in everdwindling quantities.”16 For Gates, one cost of the high-tech focus of the Pentagon is wasteful
spending and even reduction of conventional fighting capabilities, but the more serious cost is
that not enough resources are put into developing “the capabilities needed to win today’s
[asymmetric] wars and some of their likely successors.”17 Gates, then, maintains that –
notwithstanding recent improvements that he also emphasizes– the American military falls short
in its preparation for fighting irregular warfare, policing ethnic violence, providing security to
restoration efforts, training new local military personnel, and the like. And this leads him to
propose a more “balanced” military budget toward greater nonconventional fighting and
peacemaking capabilities. The U.S. National Security Strategy of May 2010 echoes the same
15
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point: “To succeed, we must balance and integrate all elements of American power and update
our national security capacity for the 21th century. We must maintain our military’s conventional
superiority, while enhancing its capacity to defeat asymmetric threats.” 18 Recognizing the limits
of American military and economic power, Gates also argues in a more recent Foreign Affairs
article of May/June this year that the U.S. is in no position to repeat wars similar to the
Afghanistan and Iraq wars, and so the American military must get better at “helping others to
defend themselves.”19
In some ways, we have progress here in terms of “just military preparedness.” A military
preparation that sets aside the notion that you can “shock and awe” people into becoming
admirers of American freedom and democracy is making a step forward. There is also progress
in the recognition that there are limits to unilateral American use of force, including nation
building. And a greater focus on counterinsurgency and post-conflict military tasks might reduce
casualties of war. At the same, it must be said that the “reprogramming” of the Pentagon is not

18

National Security Strategy of May 2010, 5,

http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf .
19

The cited article is “Helping Others Defend Themselves,” Foreign Affairs 89 (May/June 2010): 2-6.

The main difference between this article and “A Balanced Strategy” (2009) is that Gates in the 2010
article puts more emphasis on the idea – also mentioned in the 2009 article – that the United States should
assist other governments in their nonconventional wars. Correspondingly, the shortcoming of the
American military that is more emphasized in the 2010 article is that the military must get better at the
task of “helping others defend themselves.” A weakness of Gates’s analysis is that he brings up the issue
of “helping others defend themselves” in the context of arguing that fractured or failing states constitute
“the main security challenge of our time” (since terrorists are bound to flourish in such states). He pays
insufficient attention to the problem that often within such states there are no parties that with mere
assistance will become successful in governing and providing security. Accordingly, limited intervention
in such states might soon turn into massive involvement, militarily and otherwise.

12
done with the notion that America should stop playing global cop and seek to create the world in
its image; rather, the intent is that a smarter combination of developing both conventional and
nonconventional capabilities will make the cop more effective and appear less of a rogue cop.
Moreover, the Obama administration, no less than the G.W. Bush administration, turns a blind
eye to global security costs of America’s global military power projection. These costs include
asymmetric warfare, including terrorism, since conventional warfare against America’s military
superiority is bound to fail. It also includes nuclear proliferation because nuclear weapons
constitute the only effective deterrent against U.S. aggression. And America’s ever-increasing
military budget plays at least some role in explaining the increased military spending of China.
What is particularly worrisome is that the United States, even though more open to the idea of
arms control in space under the Obama administration, still has taken no concrete steps towards
preventing an arms race in space. 20
The second JMP principle is that military personnel should be educated and trained with
the general purpose of resort to force in mind and participate in moral decision-making
concerning the initiation and execution of military force. Traditionally, the military is an
authoritarian institution in which soldiers are viewed as instruments of the state. They do not
need to think for themselves, and the autonomy and dignity of soldiers is denied in the name of
fighting efficiency. Thus soldiers tend not the question the justice of their wars and their fighting
tends to reflect the enormous destructive power of their weapons, leading them regularly to use
excessive force with civilians as the most common victims in nonconventional wars. Recently,
the Pentagon has begun to emphasize counterinsurgency training with the aim of creating
20
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soldiers who use force in a more restrained and discriminatory manner and can interact
successfully with the local population. This is a step in the right direction, but it clearly falls
short of what the second JMP requires: military personnel as experts of human rights protection
by force should be treated and educated as fully morally competent agents.

Full moral

competency is not only owed to those whose human rights need to be protected or respected; it is
also owed to the soldiers themselves because we cannot reasonably require soldiers to kill unless
their own moral reflection leads them to approve of resort to force in a given case. Accordingly,
soldiers should have an extensive right to selective conscientious refusal. Additional benefits of
full moral competency and corresponding input by soldiers is that it would reduce the chance
that a country would initiate an unjust war or continue to fight an unjust war. A controversial
implication of this view is that it puts into question the so-called moral equality of soldiers – that
is, the view that soldiers are not morally responsible for wars of aggression as long as they do not
commit jus in bello crimes.
The third principle is that the military must be recruited in such a way that it reinforces
that preparation for, and possible execution of, resort to military force is a collective choice and
enterprise that impacts the moral standing of all citizens of a society and should be expressive of
their values. It is clear that American military preparation violates this principle in that our wars
are increasingly alienated wars – that is, they are wars that are fought in our name but are not
viewed as expressive of our will and responsibility. 21 To be sure, the public at large admires the
military, but, at the same time, most people do not want to pay for our wars, are not prepared to
fight them, and feel no responsibility for how our wars affect other populations. Generally, our
political elites stimulate alienated war because it makes it easier for them to resort to armed
21
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force. Two enabling factors of alienated war are the very extensive use of private security
contractors (PSCs) and the fact that the volunteer army recruits a large part of its personnel
through economic incentives, seemingly making war merely another job. The third principle
requires that PSCs are no longer used. Does it also require the end of the volunteer army and a
return to some form of conscription? Perhaps not, since the first JMP implies a severely
downsized American military and it might be possible to recruit a much smaller military on basis
of an ethics of service so that all segments of society are reflected. 22
The fourth JMP principle is that priority should be given to nonmilitary means of
preventing extensive basic human rights violations caused by armed force. The human costs of
resort to military force are immense and significantly unpredictable. Priority should therefore be
given to the measures that prevent the need to resort to military force through the elimination of
contributing factors to wars of aggression and through finding nonviolent ways of solving
conflict. Even after the outbreak of hostilities, soldiers might be able to use at times nonviolent
measures of diffusing threats, but the requirement of proper training in this regard falls under the
second principle of military preparedness. Following this JMP principle, all countries should
make it their main concern to support the United Nations in its numerous nonmilitary programs
and tasks that contribute to international security and stability, including adjudication of
emerging conflicts, promotion of human rights, environmental protection, arms control, peace
education, and refugee assistance. NGOs with similar aims should also be supported, while
high-income countries should make concerted efforts to reduce desperate global poverty and
economic inequality as contributing factors of violent conflict. All these measures will also
22
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reduce terrorism, and so the need for military counter-terrorism (to the limited extent that it
might be justified) would be reduced, as well.
It is difficult to quantify the exact proper proportion of military versus nonmilitary
spending in support of security and protection, but this should not prevent us from noting that the
current proportion is out of balance, both globally and in the United States. Consider some
figures for the United States: The ratio of military spending to budgetary support for the U.N. is
at least 100 to 1, the ratio of the military budget to official development aid is at least 20 to 1,
and the ratio of the Department of Defense spending to all spending on “Department of State,
Foreign Operations and Related Programs” is 14 to 1.23 Again, Defense Secretary Gates
acknowledges the problem in “A Balanced Strategy,” noting that there is a definite misbalance in
U.S. spending on the “war on terror” because “over the long term, the United States cannot kill
or capture its way to victory.” He continues: “Where possible, what the military calls kinetic
operations should be subordinated to measures aimed at promoting better governance, economic
programs that spur development, and efforts to address the grievances among the discontented,
from whom the terrorists recruit.”24 Accordingly, Gates proposes that the budget of the State
Department and the USAID increase relative to the Pentagon budget. This has happened in
recent years, but as the figures above show, the basic focus of American foreign policy is the
United States as global cop rather than as global diplomat or global provider of economic
assistance. And a case could be made that American foreign policy has become even more
militarized in that the raised budget of USAID and the State Department have gone hand in hand
with closer cooperation between these agencies and the Pentagon. To illustrate, the posture
23
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statement of AFRICOM emphasizes the need for integration of military, diplomatic and
humanitarian objectives and, so, we can read on the website of AFRICOM that on September 13
(2010) soldiers of the U.S. Army 418th Civil Affairs Battalion provided school supplies to 180
children in Djibouti City, and that in the middle of September medical personnel of both the U.S.
military and the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) worked for
four days side by side providing health assistance to approximately 2,000 residents of Kinshasa.
We have a real militarized American foreign policy once the face of America becomes a soldier
with a red cross badge and a machine gun in one hand and school supplies in the other hand. 25
The fifth JMP principle is that the value of security (against the threat of widespread
basic human rights violations by armed force) and the resources committed to this value must be
balanced against other human values (e.g., education and health) and the resources set aside for
their realization. It is clear that the United States violates the principle in light of the very
significant opportunity costs of its current levels of military spending, especially to vulnerable
groups in society. A mere 10% cut in its military spending would, for example, provide
adequate health care to all uninsured (at least 40 million people), preventing many more deaths
than the equivalent spending for security could conceivably effect. 26 Or, imagine the impact of
40% of the military’s budget invested in improving depressed communities, infrastructure
improvements, and public transportation. Or, consider the impact of the human ingenuity now
invested in research and development (R&D) for the military focused instead on promoting
25
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alternative energy sources. We can get a sense of this impact by noting that the Department of
Defense (DOD), with over $80 billion in R&D in 2009, accounts for more than half of all federal
R&D support. Finally, it may be noted that the military is the cause of significant environmental
damage, and that for the sake of environmental protection alone, it is necessary that the military
as the greatest polluter in the United States27 severely limits its production, development, and
testing of weapons as well as its large-scale training exercises, artillery practices, etc., whereby
then some of the freed financial resources could be used to clean up the environmental disasters
it has left behind across America and the world.
The sixth principle is that matters of military preparedness should be settled by a
competent authority with right intention (e.g., military preparedness for human rights protection,
not for profit and employment opportunities).28 In a democratic society, the representatives of
the people should be this competent authority, requiring them to communicate openly and
honestly with the citizens about the costs and benefits of competing JMP proposals. The defense
budget should be transparent to the representatives and they should allocate resources free from
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pressures of weapons manufacturers and local employment opportunities. In a word, the sixth
JMP principle requires the elimination of the ‘military industrial complex.”

4. Just Military Preparedness and its Impact on Other Just War Theory Categories
The basic connection between “just military preparedness” and the three other JW categories – “jus
ad bellum,” “jus in bello,” and “jus post bellum” – is that once the institutions and cultural practices
that must enable the execution of just wars are flawed in terms of just military preparedness, there is
bound to be a reduced justice (or increased injustice) in the actual resort to force, the manner of the
execution of military force, and in the ending of war.29 I will briefly illustrate this general point on
basis of how American hegemonic military preparedness is bound to impact the other three JWT
categories, beginning with jus ad bellum.
Consider first of all the principle of proportionality. The purpose of this principle is to place
a constraint on resort to force when there is a just cause for resort to force. Generally, the greater
the harm engendered by resort to force, the stronger the prima facie case against resort to force, and
once the harm is clearly disproportionate to the good embedded in the pursuit of the just cause,
resort to force would be wrong. Since U.S. hegemonic military preparedness aims to project power
across the globe (and even into space) with its huge expenditures, large professional army, offensive
weaponry, and military presence in dozens of countries, any U.S. intervention – even if there is a
just cause and a fairly limited scale of resort to force – will increase the global security costs
connected to the U.S. military hegemonic project. We have noted that these global security costs
include nuclear proliferation, increased terrorism, and increased military budgets and war
29
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execution, and conclusion of war, but it facilitates justice in these areas and makes it more probable.
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preparation among countries distrustful of this hegemony.

Accordingly, hegemonic military

preparedness makes it more difficult for the United States to satisfy the proportionality principle.
To illustrate, consider a possible U.S. armed intervention in Sudan. Under pressure of the
international community, North and South Sudan signed in 2005 a peace agreement ending the civil
war between them.

The agreement allows South Sudan to opt for secession on basis of a

referendum scheduled for January 2011. It is anticipated that the people of South Sudan will opt for
independence and that the central government in Khartoum might not accept secession, with the
result that the hostilities between North and South will resume. The civil war between North and
South Sudan has cost as many as 2.5 million lives over the past few decades. Should the United
States, as one of the guarantors of the 2005 peace agreement, use its military force, or threaten to
use this force, to protect the South against the militarily superior North? A case could be made that
maintenance of international order (i.e., keeping the terms of the peace agreement) would be a just
cause here; or, a just cause might emerge on humanitarian grounds because most victims of the past
civil war have been civilians. The very fact that the United States is a military hegemon strongly
counts against its resort to force in this case. The regime in North Sudan is an Islamic regime, and
American intervention would greatly benefit Islamist terrorism and strengthen Iran’s pursuit of
nuclear weapons. It also would add to China’s resolve to catch up militarily with the United States.
What would add to these global security costs in this particular case is that Iran and China are the
main weapon suppliers of North Sudan. So, if we were to come to the conclusion that an armed
intervention would be just, another intervening agent would be strongly preferable, say, a
combination of African Union and some European forces.30

30

Similarly, a case could be made that America’s hegemonic military preparation made it an error that it

became the central agent against Iraq in the Gulf War. America’s dominant role had such long-term
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We have noted that America’s unjust military preparedness raises questions about its
intention: Why does the United States want to play global cop and fulfill a role that goes far beyond
the duty of each nation to contribute to international peace. One may rightfully suspect ulterior
political and economic motives. Accordingly, when the United States seeks to resort to force, it
becomes at the outset questionable whether the principle of right intention, which requires that the
just cause will be the true purpose of intervention, will be satisfied. In the case of Sudan, we may
wonder whether U.S. intervention would not be motivated by gaining access to the extensive oil
fields of South Sudan (now mostly benefiting China). Or, we might suspect that the United States’
real aim would be to strengthen its military and political presence in Africa. AFRICOM’s posture
statement says that for its purpose of providing security in Africa in cooperation with local military
forces it needs Cooperative Security Locations (CSLs) and Forward Operating Sites (FOSs).
AFRICOM has identified ten Cooperative Security Locations, but only two Forward Operating
Sites.31 This makes it necessary for AFRICOM operations to use military bases in Europe.
Accordingly, it is to be expected that if U.S. intervention were to occur in Sudan, it would be done
with the understanding that a long-term Forwarding Operating Site would be created in South
Sudan. This would not only strengthen U.S. military hegemony with regard to Africa, but globally,
since an additional “node” in the network of U.S. bases strengthens the American capability to
strike anywhere. This adds further to the global security costs of American interventions.
There is no doubt that the United States as hegemon is inclined to act unilaterally in matters
of international security and so violate the principle of legitimate authority. In my view, countries
global security costs as the rise of Islamic terrorism, increased threats of nuclear proliferation, and
blocking a greater role of the United Nations in conflict resolution after the end of the cold war.
31
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may resort to armed force in some cases without U.N. Security Council authorization (because of its
undemocratic and power-centered veto system), but then, at least, a fairly wide consensus must be
obtained among states concerning the rightfulness of the intervention. When the global cop gets
this consensus, one always wonders whether it is intimidation, bribery (e.g., the promise of
weapons), or moral agreement that lies at the basis of the consensus. Another problem is that the
lack of transparency and democratic wills-formation regarding military preparedness issues in the
United States spills over into its resort-to-force decisions. Limited military force is often used
against other nations without any democratic oversight, and even in the case of full-scale military
conflict, Congress has not taken seriously its responsibility as the institution that should declare
war. In addition, the military industrial complex that pushes for the acquisition of hegemonic
military hardware and so weakens legitimate authority in just military preparedness also weakens
jus ad bellum legitimate authority. The reason is that the military industrial complex favors war as
an instrument of solving political conflict because war, unlike nonmilitary conflict resolution,
legitimates the replacement of this hardware and its continuous development.
This reason also illustrates that lack of justice in military preparedness is bound to weaken
the claim that a given resort to force decision by the United States has satisfied the last resort
principle, and it puts again into question the satisfaction of the principle of right intention. But the
problem goes beyond the distorting impact of war profiteering. Once, in general, a country fails to
invest adequate resources in war prevention and nonviolent conflict resolution strategies and instead
places all or most of its resources under the rubric of military conflict preparation, any claim that a
war was a last resort has, at the outset, greatly diminished credibility. And, clearly, most wars of
recent memory must be censured from this angle.
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With regard to the link between just military preparedness and jus in bello, there are a
several factors of hegemonic military preparedness that are bound to lead to violations of the
principles of noncombatant immunity and proportionality. First of all, the United States has a
variety of weapons in its arsenal, such as cluster bombs, landmines, and depleted uranium weapons,
the very use of which violates the jus in bello principle of discrimination or noncombatant
immunity, at least on the fairly strict interpretation of this principle, requiring that “due care” is
taken to avoid civilian casualties. 32 Second, the United States is bound to use high-tech hegemonic
weapons (such as missiles launched from ships or planes) that tend to make the execution of war
indiscriminate and in violation of the jus in bello principle of proportionality. The culture of the
Pentagon still favors these weapons and, surely, it benefits the arms industry. Perhaps more
importantly, the use of such weapons is easier to justify to the American people and most soldiers
than is the extensive use of troops on the ground. Consider again Sudan. Surely, the American
people and most of the military would object to some full-scale intervention and occupation, but a
bombing campaign aimed at the infrastructure of North Sudan might be tolerated as another
alienated war, with the deceptive ease and comfort that alienated war brings. Lastly, it may be
questioned whether the American military training in a culture of hegemonic military preparedness
is adequate to prevent jus in bello crimes. This concern is especially acute with regard to PSCs.
War and atrocity are deeply linked, a fact that constitutes a strong indictment of – and challenge to –
resort to force, but moral competency and critical-reflective moral education are barriers to atrocity.
So just military preparedness might not completely sever the link between war and atrocity, but
(unlike hegemonic military preparedness) it would at least drive a wedge between the two.
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The victor in a military conflict typically sets the terms of the peace settlement. Following
Brian Orend, who has in recent years proposed the new just-war category of jus post bellum, a just
peace requires a public and measured peace settlement; the long-term restoration of the basic rights
violated by the aggressor; punishment of the initiators of the war of aggression; punishment of
soldiers on both sides who have committed war crimes; compensation; and rehabilitation of the
aggressor nation, including the transformation of its political and military institutions so that the
aggressor nation becomes a good global citizen of the community of nations. 33
Even when the United States is a righteous victor, reasonable doubts may be raised about its
ability and credibility to establish a just peace along these lines. Temporary military bases might be
justified to supervise a transition toward a rehabilitated society. However, the United States has a
historical record of establishing permanent military bases in foreign countries, often against the
popular will and serving its hegemonic military interests. It also imposes its own vision of the good
society, including privatizing state enterprises and services and opening up local markets to its
corporations, while pushing its military hardware to newly installed regimes. America’s efforts to
exempt its military from any prosecution outside its own jurisdiction will increasingly raise
questions about its capacity to justly punish enemy soldiers (or insurgents).
Add to this that American interventions have been frequent since the United States strived to
become a hegemonic military force in 1945 and often have been morally questionable or clear acts
of aggression – and, of course, aggressor victors cannot bring about a just peace –, and we must
conclude that the United States has thoroughly undermined its credibility as a nation that is able to
impose rehabilitation measures on other nations. Instead, it is high time that the United States
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engages in self-rehabilitation – its hegemonic position prevents that other countries rightfully would
impose coercive rehabilitation on the United States – and moves toward just military preparedness.
Finally, we may see the just military principles not only as a corrective of just war theory.
They also have a status similar to Immanuel Kant’s preliminary articles of perpetual peace that
apply during times of tentative peace. Here some pacifists and just war theorists might find some
common ground in how we should move forward toward a less violent global society.

